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This paper analyses the main drivers of global income inequality while testing
some of the most relevant economic theories on inequality evolution. We run fixed
effects regressions on four different income inequality measures, using a panel of
157 countries, for the period 1960-2015. We find evidence that, while labor market
reforms and unemployment were two upturning drivers of inequality, governments
have an important rebalancing role, despite their decreased size. Furthermore, al-
though social and political globalization reduced inequality, overall globalization and
the widening of financial systems increased inequality. These findings suggest that
the 1980s transition from post-war regulated capitalism to neoliberal capitalism led
to a worldwide upsurge of inequality within countries. The effect of liberalization
on inequality is confirmed when we perform a causal analysis using the European
Eastern Bloc transition of the 1990s as a quasi-experiment.
Keywords: inequality extraction ratio, income inequality, augmented kuznet’s
curve, country fixed effects, difference-in-differences.
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1 Introduction
Global inequality has been rising over the last 30 years and today is at the forefront of the
public debate. Former US President Barack Obama declared it as the “defining challenge
of our time” and IMF director Christine Lagarde has been driving attention towards the
priority of fighting rising inequality, to tackle the middle-class crisis. Pope Francis speaks
against the current “economy of exclusion” which promotes growing inequality, the “root
of social evil”.
There is an intrinsic sentiment of unfairness towards the current global economic sys-
tem, which intensified after the most-severe financial crisis since the “Great Depression”.
In 2014, when asked about the greatest threat to the world, 60% of respondents in western
societies (Europe and US) replied that “concerns about inequality trump all others” (Pew
Research Center). Even before the crisis, 90% of the people in countries like Portugal and
Italy agreed that inequality was too high (OECD, 2008). After the “Great Recession” of
2007-2008, much attention has been devoted to the struggle of the bottom 99% who have
less wealth than the swelling top 1%, with vast manifestations of disgruntlement from
movements like Occupy Wall Street (Credit Suisse, 2016).
Beyond the public opinion, experts and researchers are stressing out the severity of
the degree of inequality and the aftermaths it poses on political stability, social cohesion
and sustainable prosperity. The World Economic Forum outlined rising inequality as the
biggest risk for the global economy in 2017, and that the gap between top and bottom
deciles was at the root of Donald Trump’s victory and the Brexit (The Global Risks
Report, 2017). Recent Oxfam reports speak of growing crony capitalism which endorsed
widening inequality even at the very top.1 The number of the richest billionaires who
detain the same wealth as the bottom half of humanity went from 388, in 2010, to 62
with their wealth growing by 44% in just 5 years (Hardoon et al., 2016). Shockingly, this
year’s report announced that the number decreased to just eight people (Hardoon, 2017).
Moreover, about one-third of the 1810 billionaires in 2016 Forbes List, who possess the
same as the bottom 70%, inherited their wealth (Jacobs, 2015).
Figure 1: World Income Inequality Rise: Market Gini – Deciles
1Cronyism is the form of capitalism which technically operates as a free-market but depends on
preferential regulation, tax breaks and other forms of favorable state interventionism, which are achieved
through close connections to government officials.
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Although wealth inequality is higher than income inequality, the two are evermore
interconnected as those at the top have a larger proportion of capital income and their
labor compensation is indexed to the stock and option markets (OECD, 2015). Since
1980, the real average pre-tax income of the bottom 50% stagnated, whereas the income
of the top 1% grew fourfold, earning more than 80 times that of the former (Piketty and
Zucman, 2016). Moreover, between 1940 and 1980, the ratio of the average executive
(CEO) compensation over the mean wage – which is much higher than the median wage
– was stable around 50, while after the 1980s it skyrocketed, reaching 350 in early 2000s
(Frydman and Saks, 2005).
Following Atkinson (2015), to briefly describe the evolution of global income inequality,
over the last century, one must distinguish its within and between dimensions. Initially,
inequality within rich countries was falling and differences between countries where widen-
ing. This period was followed by another where inequality between countries converged
but inequality within countries amplified. Figure 1 portrays the convergence of global
market income inequality, around 1980, followed by a common upward trend across in-
come groups. From 1980 onwards, countries with very different degrees of development
converged to higher levels of inequality, registering a worldwide upsurge in market ginis
of 5 to 10 percentage points. It also shows the growth in the share of the world’s top 10%,
which today have roughly 30 percent of the world’s income, at the expense of shrink-
ing bottom 10% and 5th deciles shares – evidencing the widening of imbalances within
countries, across the globe.
This paper investigates and assesses the main drivers of global income inequality,
using a panel of 157 countries constructed by the author, combining several datasources,
over the period 1960-2015. Section 2.1 presents an overview of the literature on the
relationship between growth and inequality. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 summarize the main
theories and empirical findings relating inequality with labor markets, globalization and
financial markets. Section 3 describes the data construction and respective sources. The
three econometric methodologies are explained in Section 4, followed by our empirical
results in Section 5: first we investigate the relationship between growth and income
dispersion; the main determinants of inequality are analyzed in subsection 5.2; lastly, we
delve into the exposure of the Eastern European Bloc to the global economy as a quasi-
experiment. In Section 6 we propose an historical explanation for the Inequality Turn
(1980s) relating to our main findings. We finally conclude in Section 7, providing some
limitations and further research.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Inequality and Growth – Consequences
The most influential theory on the relationship between inequality and growth is the pi-
oneering work of Simon Kuznet in 1955, who argued that inequality follows an inverted
U-shaped path. Kuznet assumes a 2-sector (rural and urban) economy; development
leads workers to shift from the more egalitarian agriculture to the more unequal indus-
try, rising income and overall inequality. Later, with shrinking agriculture, the relative
wage of rural workers increases, decreasing inequality. Modern adaptations divide the
economy into old and new technology (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1997; Helpman, 1997) or
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financially underdeveloped and modern sectors (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). The
temptation to conclude that inequality is an inevitable consequence of early growth and
will eventually decline does not survive Kuznet’s own claim that “The paper is perhaps 5
per cent empirical information and 95 per cent speculation, some of it possibly tainted by
wishful thinking.” (indeed, his analysis was based on a few observations from UK, USA
and Germany).
Although cross-section studies before the neoliberal era (1980s onward) mostly con-
firmed the Kuznet curve (Ahluwalia, 1976, Paukert, 1973; Chenery et al., 1974; Bacha,
1979), later work suggested that it explains little of the variation in inequality (Papanek
and Kyn, 1986; Kaelble and Thomas, 1991; Barro, 2000), it has weakened over time
(Anand and Kanbur, 1993), and poorly fits the evolution of inequality within countries
(Li, Squire, and Zou, 1998). Thereafter, it is imperative to assess how national idiosyn-
cratic policies and institutions affect country’s income distributions (Williamson, 1991;
Kaelble and Thomas, 1991), particularly since the theory does not explain the “Inequality
Turn” (Atkinson, 2015) of most industrialized countries, beginning in the 1980s (Gustafs-
son, 1999).2
As stressed by Stiglitz (1998), economists, inspired by the Second Theorem of Welfare
Economics, have traditionally separated equity from efficiency, with some interpreting
the division as a tradeoff (e.g. Okun, 1997). However, as many neoclassical models, it
relies on unrealistic assumptions such as no unemployment, complete markets, and perfect
information. Abandoning representative agents models, there is a growing literature on
the recessive effects of inequality, with empirical support surveyed in Benabou (1996),
and in the meta-analysis by Neves et al.(2016). Significant negative relationships between
different measures of inequality and growth were found with panels of more than 50
countries for 1960-1985 (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Perotti,
1996) and during the 1970s, for both democratic and non-democratic countries (Clark,
1995). From 1960s to 1990s, most research has found recessive inequality effects, using the
Deininger and Squire inequality database,3 with the exception of some studies employing
System GMM and panel techniques (Li and Zou, 1998; Deininger and Olinto, 2000, Forbes,
2000). These positive impacts have been challenged by Lee and Son (2016), using the
same method with more recent data, and Barro (2000), who noted the small sample and
the sensitivity to measurement-error. New evidence reinforces the negative impact of
inequality on growth and its sustainability (Berg and Ostry, 2011), but also finds that
redistribution does not significantly hinder growth – rejecting Okun’s proposition (Ostry
et al., 2014). In another IMF paper, authors found an inverse relationship between the
share of the top 20% and growth (benefits do not tickle-down) whereas increasing the
share of the first, second and even the third quintiles (poor and middle-class) significantly
promotes growth (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015).
The consequences of inequality go beyond its impact on GDP. It may concentrate
decision making power on few agents, cause political instability, bring about suboptimal
2Jaumotte (2013): “While improvements in technology, liberal market-oriented reforms, and the entry
of China and countries from the former Soviet bloc into the global economy have led to an unprecedented
level of integration of the world economy (...) inequality has risen in most countries and regions over
the past two decades, including in developed countries which were thought to have reached levels of
prosperity where inequality would level off in line with the predictions of the Kuznet’s hypothesis.”
3Deininger and Squire, 1998, Birdsall and Londono, 1997, Castell and Domench, 2002; Banerjee and
Duflo, 2003, Knowles, 2005
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human resource allocation and raise the risk of crisis (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). If it rests
on rents, agents invest in seeking favored treatment which may lead to nepotism, corrup-
tion, erosion of social cohesion, and of institutional confidence (Stiglitz, 2012). Several
empirical studies found that inequality impelled socio-political instability, in turn giving
rise to more inequality – “vicious cycle of inequality” (Stiglitz, 2012) – and consequently
dulled growth.4 Other outcomes negatively impacted by inequality include: school en-
rollment (Checchi, 1999); happiness (Ramos, 2014); intergenerational mobility, as shown
by Corak’s (2013) The Great Gatsby curve.5 Finally, using a panel of 112 countries over
the period 1970-2010, Kotschy and Sunde (2015) found that equality is crucial for the
positive and lasting association between democracy and institutional quality.
2.2 Labor Markets
One of the mechanisms linking labour markets to inequality is the“skill-biased technolog-
ical change” (SBTC), i.e., the increase in the relative demand for highly skilled workers
vis-à-vis the unskilled caused by the technological revolution of circa 1980. Empirically,
it is difficult to assess and “is usually subsumed in the unexplained part of modeling”,
although Katz and Autor (1999) view it as the most important driver of inequality based
on their literature review.6 Using a panel of 51 countries from 1981 to 2003, Jaumotte et
al. (2013) finds that the share of ICT in capital stock was the main determinant of in-
equality. Kanbur and Stiglitz (2015) argue that these competitive marginal productivity
theories of factor returns assume a constant share of capital, which is not consistent with
the reality of many industrialized economies, and that new models need to incorporate
rent-generating mechanisms and a greater focus on the “rules of the game” (Stiglitz et
al. 2015). Brown and Cambell (2002) show that ICT explains inequality in less devel-
oped countries, whereas in advanced ones globalization is more important.7 Card and
DiNardo (2002) argued that SBTC should have widened gender inequality, which did
not occur, and Atkinson (2007b) said that “constant SBTC rate does not yield a per-
manent skilled/unskilled wage differential, as long as the relative supply is sufficiently
elastic”. Bogliacino and Lucchese (2011) use a quasi-experiment to conclude that inter-
national differences are determined by labor market flexibilization and tax reforms, and
not SBTC. Lemieux (2008) argues that SBTC totally neglects the role of institutions
while he finds that deunionization alone explained one third of expanding inequality, in
the United States, and performance pay at the top (bonuses, stocks and options) accounts
for a substantial inequality growth in the top quintile.8
4Londregan and Poole, 1990; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Perotti, 1996; Svensson, 1998; Sylwester,
2000; Keefer and Knack; 2002.
5Ramos (2014) reviews the papers that use self-reported measures of satisfaction as a proxy for well-
being and controls for individual fixed effects. Intergenarational mobility is the elasticity between the
child’s adult earnings and that of its parents – essentially, how much does the income of the parents
determines the future income of their children.
6Handbook of Income Distribution, Volume 2B (Checchi et al., 2015) Chapter 18: Labor Market
Institutions and the Dispersion of Wage Earnings.
7Krugman (2008) criticized his earlier view that technology explained the inequality upturn much
more than the process of globalization. Irwin (2008), Katz (2008) and Autor (2010) also criticize the
neglected role of globalization. Atkinson (2008) points out that a supply response over the SBTC would
only lead to a higher level of inequality and not to the permanent upward trend since 1980.
8Consistent with the findings of Alvaredo et al., 2013; Atkinson and Piketty, 2007, 2010; Atkinson et
al., 2011; Piketty and Saez, 2003, 2006.
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The institutional approach gained emphasis in the 1990s and focuses on labor market
institutions like minimum wage, collective bargaining, employment protection legislation
(EPL) and unionization.9 Though it is easier to test empirically, findings are mixed.
Labor market institutions can have equalising effects on the employed at the expense
of increasing unemployment. Card and Krueger (2015)’s recent survey of the empirical
literature concludes for little or no effect of minimum wages on employment. Higher
EPL may worsen income distributions through unemployment (Lemieux et al., 2009). A
decline in union rates tends to reduce relative bargaining power of workers, and can also
decrease inequality of opportunities.10 Overall labor market deregulation tends to worsen
the distribution of income (Calderon and Chong, 2009; OECD, 2011), increase the share
of the top decile and decrease that of bottom 10% (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015), and is often
associated with waning working conditions of workers (OECD, 2004; Hberli et al., 2012).
2.3 Globalization and Financial Markets
Globalization and financial openness have been the dominant economic paradigm over
the last three decades, coinciding with between-country convergence and within-country
divergence, fueling a mayhem of opinions in the public and academic debate. The mech-
anism that may link the two operates through labor income. Globalization encompasses
increase in trade and financial flows across nations, flourishing from liberalization; and
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) (Mah, 2003).11 Some argue that economic
integration helps reduce poverty, promote democracy, and reduce inequality (see, e.g.,
Bhagwati, 2004, and Zhou et al., 2011, for the millions of people lifted out of poverty in
India and China). Others that it promotes economic insecurity and inequality in devel-
oping and developed countries.12
According to the neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin model, (Stolper-Samuelson’s 1941 the-
orem) trade openness increases the relative return of the abundant factor – capital and/or
high-skilled labor in developed countries, and labor in developing ones – thus increasing
inequality in the former and decreasing it in the latter.13 The theory is consistent with the
co-existence of growth and reduced inequality in the “East Asia miracle”, but inconsistent
with prolonged inequality increases in Brazil (with high growth) and India (with stagna-
tion) in the 1960s and 1970s, and the rising trade and inequality of some Asian and many
Latin American economies in the post-1980 period.14 In fact, some studies found evidence
9Blackburn et al. 1990, Freeman 1991, Levy and Murnane (1992), Fortin and Lemieux 1997, DiNardo
and Lemieux 1997.
10For the equalizing effects of unions see e.g. Card et al., 2004; Herzer, 2014; Dabla-Norris et al.,
2015; Osorio-Buitron et al., 2015; For papers refering to the positive association between union density
and worker’s bargaining power refer to e.g. Frederiksen and Poulsen, 2010; Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010;
Checchi et al. (2008) found positive correlations between equality of opportunities and: union density,
wage centralization and labor market regulations.
11David Kotz (2015) sees globalization as “significant increase in the movement of goods, services,
capital, and money across national boundaries, resulting in a capitalism that is more globally integrated
than before, including the creation of global production and distribution chains far more developed than
those existing in earlier periods”.
12see e.g. Bergh and Nilsson, 2011; Cornia et al., 2004; Marjit et al., 2004; Stiglitz, 2002; Borjas and
Ramey, 1994.
13The mechanism works through the respective specialisation of the developing country in the low-
skilled-intensive technology and the developed one in the capital or high-skill-intensive one.
14Handbook of Income Distribution (Kanbur, 2015), Chapter 20: Globalization and Inequality.
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of globalization increasing inequality in both developing and advanced economies.15 Ad-
ditionally, while some studies found no clear relationship between trade and inequality
(Edwards, 1997; Li, Squire and Zou, 1998), others finds that trade increased inequality
in developed countries but not in developing ones (Sebastian, 1997; Dreher and Gaston,
2008), and some papers’ results are entirely at odds with the theorem’s predictions.16
The lack of empirical consistency of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory prompted several au-
thors to extend the model in a number of directions.17 In a setting where final output
is produced using intermediate inputs and there is free-trade – such as the globalized
economy –, develop countries outsource intermediate production phases to developing
countries. This FDI reallocates the activity that is least-skilled intensive in the eyes of
the advanced economy and the most-skilled intensive in developing countries. Thus, out-
sourcing exacerbates the production skill intensity in both types of economies, widening
the income dispersion in both countries (a SBTC mechanism). Accordingly, Jaumotte et
al. (2013) finds a positive association between inward FDI and inequality (while exports
relative to GDP have an equalizing effect). Similarly, Asteriou et al. (2014) found that
trade decreased, financial openness increased, and technology had no impact on inequality
in EU-27, with FDI being the major driver.18
A different explanation which is also consistent with these results is the dependency
theory (Firebaugh and Beck, 1994), which argues that FDI and trade create dependency
of developing countries on advanced ones, with negative socio-economic consequences in
the long term. Large multinationals can form a high capital-intensive exporting sector,
separated from the rest of the economy (creating dualism in productive structures), only
to then extradite most of the accrued profits (Faustino et al., 2011).
Theory offers ambiguous predictions on the relationship between financial development
and income distribution. The extensive margin of allowing the poor access to financial
services has an equalizing effect (Abiad et al., 2008). The intensive margin of quality
and range improvements upgrades the conditions for those already enjoying financial
services (Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990). Consistent with the predictions of Claessens
and Perotti (2007) that most of the benefits are attained by a small elite, Jaumotte
et al. (2013) found that financial openness mainly benefited the top 20%, Roine et al.
(2008) concludes that financial openness is pro-rich, and Das and Mohapatra (2003) found
evidence that equity market’s liberalization benefits the top quintile at the expense of
the “middle class”, with no effect on the poor. This conclusion is conditional on weak
institutions that allow access to finance to be molded by those who have political influence,
to maximize their benefits (Rajan, 2003; Delis et al, 2014; Chong, 2007; Law et al.,
15Beck et al., 2007; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Goldberg-Koujianou and Pavcnik, 2007; International
Monetary Fund,2007a,b; Freeman, 2010 though FDI which they argue to be concentrated in higher skill-
and technology-intensive sector.
16Brenton, 1998; Savvides 1998; Barro, 2000; Haskel and Slaughter, 2000, 2001; Lundberg and Squire,
2003; see also Winters, et al. (2004) literature survey conclusions; Milanovic and Squire, 2005; Gourdon
et al. 2008; Stockhammer 2013, 2017. Empirical support may be found, e.g., in Wood, 1994; Bourguignon
and Morrisson, 1990; Caldern and Chong, 2001; Bergh and Nilsson 2010; Hanson and Harrison, 1999.
17See, e.g., Wood’s (1994) three-factor model, Davis’s (1996) three-goods one. Helpman et al. (2010)
focus on worker and firm heterogeneity where production involves a fixed cost, and inequality may increase
in both types of countries because of the selection effects in exporting decisions.
18see also Lee (2006) who showed that FDI raises inequality significantly, using a panel of 14 old EU
members for the period 1951-1992; Acharyya (2011) which is in line with the SBTC view on FDI; Wu
and Hsu (2012) also found evidence that FDI increase inequality in countries with low levels of absorptive
capacity, using a panel of 54 countries over the period of 1980-2005.
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2014). On the other hand, with panels of more than 50 countries, and using M2/GDP or
credit variables as proxies, some papers found evidence of equalizing effects from financial
openness.19 Zhang (2016) found that financial access, deepening and stability reduce
inequality while liberalization increases it. Empirical literature using credit and stock
market capitalization as measures of financial openness found positive relationships with
income inequality.20 Lastly, Stockhammer (2013, 2017) found that financialization, which
is associated with the decay of labor bargaining power, has had the largest contribution
to the decline in the wage share and, thus, increased inequality since capital is more
concentrated (see e.g. Dumenil and Levy, 2011).
3 Data and Variables
3.1 Inequality Measures
We choose four measures of income inequality. The most commonly used is the gini
coefficient which ranges from 0 (total income equality) to 100 (one person has all national
income). We use the net gini coefficient (income distribution after taxes and transfers)
and the market/gross gini to capture the importance of government and the effects it
hinders on various exogenous forces. One limitation of gini coefficients is that they are
more sensitive to changes around the mean (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015; Piketty and Saez,
2013; Kakwani, 1980). Moreover, recent literature is stressing the fact that inequality
trends are closely related to what happens at the top of the distribution and that “the
study of top incomes is important from the standpoint of overall inequality and of the
design of public policy” (Piketty et al, 2011). Accordingly, we also use the income share
of the top 10 percent.
Unlike vastly used series such as GDP, inequality is usually estimated with higher
measurement error with differences in terms of population, age and geographical cov-
erage, welfare proxy (e.g. gross income or consumption), equivalence scale applied and
inclusion of items like non-monetary income and imputed-rents – which represented 10
percent of UK’s 2012 GDP (Atkinson, 2015).21 For these reasons, cross-country and time-
series analysis is burdened with a tradeoff between coverage and comparability (Atkinson
and Brandolini, 2001). From all inequality databases, the Standardized World Income
Inequality Database (SWIID) and the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database
(WIID) are the most adequate for panel cross-country analysis.
The SWIID uses a missing-data multiple imputation algorithm to standardize obser-
vations from various sources: WIID, Luxembourg Income Study, World Bank, Eurostat,
OECD Income Distribution Database, and many others.22 By doing so, it maximizes the
comparability and it is the largest inequality dataset, covering 174 countries for the period
from 1960 to 2015. In this paper we use its latest version (SWIID 5.1) to retrieve the net
19Naceur and Zhang, 2016; Hamori and Hashiguchi, 2012; Kappel, 2010; Beck et al., 2007; Clarke et
al., 2006.
20Gimet, 2011 found that the effect is mainly channeled by the banking sector; Jauch and Watzka,
2012; Li and Yu, 2015; Denk and Cournde, 2015; Jaumotte and Buitron, 2015.
21Equivalence scale methodologies account for economies of scale within a household by applying de-
creasing weights to additional members of the latter, and lower values for children.
22Frederick Solt, 2009, “The Standardized World Income Inequality Database”, hdl:1902.1/11992, Har-
vard Dataverse, V15.
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and market gini coefficients, and construct the Inequality Extraction Ratio – our fourth
measure of income inequality.
On the other hand, the WIID provides multiple country-year duplicates from different
sources, incorporating 8 selection criteria variables discriminating the comparability con-
cerns explained above.23 We downloaded the income distribution variables – deciles and
quintiles – from the WIID 3.4 (Jan. 2017), based on a rigorous comparability selection:
only observations covering total population, age and area, ranked high or average quality,
based on family or household and expenditure or disposable income, were used.24
3.1.1 Inequality Extraction Ratio
Another limitation of the gini is that is makes little sense when assessed at the upper
bound. A society with a (net) gini close to 1 is one where almost everybody has no
income at all. Consequently, these individuals would not be able to afford basic living
consumption, and would eventually die. Therefore, an annual gini of 1 would ultimately
approach 0 within the same year. The innovative Inequality Extraction Ratio (IER),
developed by Branko Milanovic (2007), deals with this limitation. Suppose the society is
composed solely of 2 groups – the elite and the rest of the population – where the former
can be seen as one person and individuals within each group receive the same mean
income. The maximum feasible gini is reached in the situation where everybody receives
the physiological minimum of subsistence except for the elite, which gets the entire surplus
of total income.25 This maximum follows a positive and concave relationship with the
economy’s mean income (GDP per capita), and this function is defined as the inequality
possibility frontier (IPF). The IER is then the ratio of the standard gini over the maximum
gini.
Constructing the IER for different countries and years poses some methodological
challenges, specifically due to the computation of the maximum gini. Following the
methodology of Milanovic, to proxy a country’s development level, we used the GDP
per capita (1990 GK$) from Maddison’s Project database.26,27 Furthermore, we assumed
the physiological minimum to be 300 (1990 GK$) as it is consistent with the Word Bank’s
absolute poverty line of $1.08 per day in 1993 dollars PPP (Chen and Ravallion, 2007),
which corresponds to 365 (1990 GK$) annually. Given that it has been estimated that
close to a billion people live below that threshold, it is reasonable to take this value as
the subsistence minimum (Milanovic, 2010).28 Additionally, one must consider that, just
like national poverty lines, the minimum acceptable income in a society increases as it
develops – i.e. physiological minimum becomes social minimum (Chen and Ravallion,
2013). This is in line with the view of economist like Amartya Sen who see poverty be-
23UNU-WIDER, World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.4).
24As stressed by Jenkins (2014), it is imperative that authors report and justify the algorithm and
selection rules used for the subsample.
25The interest reader may find the full analytical derivation of the maximum feasible gini and the IER,
following Milanovic (2010), in the Appendix.
26The Geary-Khamis dollar is the most used international currency measure for comparisons across
countries and over time. It is used to compare living standards since it incorporates both the average
price of commodities and the concept of purchasing power parity.
27The Maddison-Project, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 version.
28Note also that the lowest GDP per capita in our dataset is 403 (1990 GK$), corresponding to Sierra
Leone in 1999.
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yond a physiological condition. However, the social minimum does not increase with the
country’s mean income in a proportional manner – elasticity λ is lower than 1. Empirical
literature on subjective poverty suggests that this elasticity is between 0.4 and 0.7 (Flik
and van Praag, 1991), whereas others found that it is around 0.33 for most countries and
zero for the 20 poorest nations (Chen and Ravallion 2013). Henceforth, we take the World
Bank’s classification of country’s income level and assign elasticities to formula (1), in the
following way: Low income=0, Lower middle income=0.3, Upper middle income=0.4,
High income: non-OECD=0.55 and OECD=0.7.
GMax(α, λIncGroup) = 1−
1
α
αλ 7→ IER = Gini
GMax
(1)
This is the formula for the maximum gini in a society with only the 2 groups mentioned,
where the proportion of the elite approaches zero (ε → 0) and α is the economy’s mean
income relative to the subsistence level. As we can see, the maximum feasible inequality
increases with the countries relative development (α) but with higher elasticities (λ) it is
reached sooner. Despite the fact that the IER does not satisfy one of the World Bank’s
Poverty Manual, 2008 criteria for inequality measures (mean independence), it accounts
for the development level of a country and proxies the share of inequality the elite is
extracting from the maximum gini possible (Milanovic, 2013). To our knowledge this is
the first study to build the IER in a panel dataset for modern cross-country analysis.
3.2 Determinants
To proxy levels of globalization, we use the KOF Index (Dreher and Axel, 2006; updated
in 2008) which ranges from 0 to 100 and is available for 150 countries from 1970-2013.
The index is a weighted average of 3 components of globalization: economic (36%), social
(38%) and political (26%). In turn, each of the components are weighted indexes of
relevant variables.29
In order to assess the weight of the financial system in each country we resort to the
External Wealth of Nations Mark II database (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2011) comprising
data on financial assets and liabilities for portfolio equity, FDI, debt, derivatives and
foreign reserves (minus gold), from 1970-2011, for 188 countries. We construct the variable
Financial Openness by summing total assets and liabilities over GDP (USD), making it
comparable across countries and suitable for panel regressions.
The Fraser Institute develops the Economic Freedom of the World 2016 database which
uses data from the WTO, IMF, World Bank, WEF and others to construct standardized
indexes and sub-indexes for 5 different areas (government, legal system, monetary policy,
international trade and regulation), covering 160 countries, over the period of 1970 to
29 Economic globalization = [Actual Flows (50%)–Trade (% of GDP) (21%)+ Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (% of
GDP) (27%)+ Portfolio Investment (% of GDP) (24%)+ Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (% of GDP) (27%)] +
[Restrictions (50%) = Hidden Import Barriers (24%)+ Mean Tariff Rate (28%)+ Taxes on International Trade (% of current
revenue) (26%)+ Capital Account Restrictions (22%)]; Social globalization = [Personal Contact (33%) = Telephone Traffic
(25%) + Transfers (% of GDP) (4%) + International Tourism (26%) + Foreign Population (percent of total population)
(21%) + International letters (per capita) (24%)] + [Information Flows (35%) = Internet Users (per 1000 people) (36%) +
Television (per 1000 people) (37%) + Trade in Newspapers (% of GDP) (27%)] + [Cultural Proximity (32%) = Number of
McDonald’s Restaurants (per capita) (45%) Number of Ikea (per capita) (45%) Trade in books (percent of GDP) (10%)];
Political globalization = Embassies in Country (25%) + Membership in International Organizations (28%) + Participation
in U.N. Security Council Missions (22%) + International Treaties (25%).
9
2014. As a proxy for Government size, we compute the simple average of the underlying
data from 3 relevant components of government index: transfers and subsidies (Transfers),
public consumption and public investment shares (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015). To measure
labor market flexibility, we use the sub-index of labor market regulation’s (5B) (Gwartney
et al. 2012), which ranges from 0 to 10 (= no regulations), taking in dimensions such
as hiring and firing regulations, collective bargaining, dismissal cost, conscription and
minimum wages. To our knowledge, no paper as studied the impact of this variable on
inequality before.
Data for unemployment was downloaded from the World Bank’s WDI which col-
lected national estimates as percentage of total labor force from the ILO’s Labor Market
database. The dummy for socialist countries was generated by us, taking the value of 1
if the country was part of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, or is considered as communist.30
Furthermore, we use the Penn World Tables (PWT 9.0) database to extract the share of
government consumption at PPP (State), the share of labor compensation, the population
level in millions, the Human Capital index – based on Barro-Lee educational database.
The proxy for tax system progressivity is the average rate progression up to four times the
mean income (ARP all of the World Tax Indicators database).31 The democracy measure
used ranges from -10 (total autocracy) to 10 (total democracy) and was downloaded from
the Polity IV database (Marshall, 2015), which covers 164 countries for at least the period
from 1960 to 2010. The level of inequality in education is measured by the educational gini
constructed by Bas and Jieli van Leeuween in 2013, and can be found in CLIO-INFRA
database.
Finally, we also include a set of controls, retrieved from the World Development In-
dicators (WDI) database, that are usual in the literature: inflation, growth, urban and
elderly population rate, female mortality rate, domestic credit and investment (% GDP),
employment rate in agriculture and share of employment in industry.32 Following Jau-
motte (2013), a vital covariate is a measure for technology which we proxy with ICT
exports share of total exports, retrived from UNCTADstat database.33
Our final dataset is an unbalanced panel of 157 counties, between 1960 and 2015.
30See the Appendix for the complete list of countries identified by the dummy.
31“Average rate progression characterizes the structural progressivity of national tax schedules with
respect to the changes in average rates along the income distribution. It is the slope coefficient from
regressing actual average tax rates on the log of gross income.” (Andrew Young School of Policy Studies,
2010)
32For the selection of relevant covariates when explaining inequality differences see e.g. Gustafsson
1999, Beck et al. 2000; Hopkins (2004) who conducts an extensive Bayesian approach, Lopez et al. 2008,
Ballarino et al. 2012, Subir et al. 2013, Baumgarten 2014, Dabla-Norris et al. 2015.
33To incorporate the SBTC argument, the authors explicitly say that “Any empirical estimation of the
overall effects of globalization therefore needs to explicitly account for changes in technology in countries.”
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Min. Max. Obs. Countries Source
Inequality Extraction Ratio 45.1 (19.85) 14.63 185.55 3912 157 SWIID 5.1
Market Gini Coefficient 44.86 (8.37) 18.53 76.89 3912 157 SWIID 5.1
Net Gini Coefficient 36.31 (9.60) 14.06 67.21 3912 157 SWIID 5.1
Top 10% Share of Total Income 28.89 (7.84) 17.07 61.49 1463 140 WIID 3.4
Labor Market Flexibility Index 5.94 (1.44) 1.84 9.46 1529 129 Gwartney et al, 2012
Unemployment Rate 8.84 (5.82) 0 59.5 2283 136 ILO L.M.
Government Size 19.63 (7.58) 4.17 76.74 1770 132 Gwartney et al, 2012
Globalization Index 54.55 (18.44) 12.96 92.63 3452 150 Dreher et al, 2008
Financial Openness % GDP 299.93 (1495.01) 9.75 24074.93 3095 139 Lane et al, 2011
Political Globalization 65.01 (22.26) 3.18 98.42 3458 151 Dreher et al, 2008
Social Globalization 47.03 (23.12) 6.5 93.61 3458 151 Dreher et al, 2008
Income (GDP per capita) 8056.11 (7321.91) 403.53 39387.43 3912 157 Maddison, 2013
State Consumption % GDP 0.19 (0.09) 0.02 0.72 3663 146 PWT 9.0
Transfers + Subsidies % GDP 10.83 (8.23) 0 37.2 1633 123 PWT 9.0
Tax System Progressivity 0.04 (0.03) 0 0.14 1927 136 World Tax Indicators
FDI inward % GDP 0.42 (2.14) 0 44.74 3151 137 Lane et al, 2011
Socialist Dummy 0.24 (0.43) 0 1 3912 157 –
Democracy Index 4.2 (6.48) -10 10 3204 140 Marshall, 2015
Human Capital Index 2.41 (0.70) 1.01 3.73 3425 129 PWT 9.0
Investment % GDP 2.71 (1.14) 0.27 11.19 3665 148 WDI
Labor Compensation % GDP 0.56 (0.11) 0.16 0.86 3268 118 PWT 9.0
Union Density Rate 37.33 (21.4) 4.95 99.07 1218 51 ICTWSS 5.1
Inflation Rate 0.48 (0.29) 0.04 2.24 3665 148 PWT 9.0
Educational Gini 30.85 (19.1) 3.77 99.41 3126 127 Bas et al, 2013
Female Mortality Rate 157.99 (119.83) 34.35 799.38 3694 152 WDI
Urban Population Rate 56.99 (23.03) 5.06 100 3787 152 WDI
Elderly Population Rate 8.27 (4.95) 1.13 23.59 3787 152 WDI
Population (millions) 52.21 (156.23) 0.06 1362.51 3665 148 PWT 9.0
GDP growth rate 3.7 (5.33) -50.25 88.96 3571 150 WDI
Technology (ICT exports %) 5.9 (10.05) 0 63.64 1454 132 UNCTADstat
Domestic Credit % GDP 48.51 (43.39) 0.19 312.15 3357 146 WDI
Employment Rate in Agriculture 17.82 (17.54) 0.1 92.2 2240 133 WDI
Employment Rate in Industry 24.88 (7.49) 2.2 50.2 2264 133 WDI
4 Econometric Strategy
We begin our analysis of the determinants of global income inequality by testing the sem-
inal Kuznets hypothesis and building on the augmented Kuznets relationship (Milanovic,
1994), running Pooled OLS. Econometrically, the Kuznets is tested by regressing the in-
come per capita and its quadratic form, on a measure of inequality, expecting a significant
positive sign for the former and a negative one for the latter.34 Since there might have
been unobserved global shocks (e.g. business cycles) influencing the level of inequality
across countries, we add to Milanovic’s approach by including time fixed effects δt in all
specifications and account for heteroskedasticy using clustered standard errors in all spec-
ifications. We start by regressing the Kuznets reduced form and its augmented version
which accounts for country’s public policy factors: the extent of State consumption and
the share of government Transfers (and subsidies) over GDP.35 The augmentation incor-
porates factors that, from policy makers’ point of view, are “given” in the short run and
those that spring from policy decisions. Following the concerns of the literature, we argue
that the progressivity level of a country’s tax system and the degree of FDI intake are
two important elements that should be included in the public policy scope (Williamson,
34Following most of literature we use the natural logarithmic transformation of GDP per capita level.
35Milanovic (1994) used the share of workers employed in the state and para-statal sector.
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1991; Kaelble and Thomas, 1991). Furthermore, we test the relevance of the political
regime by including a dummy for countries that are considered socialist. Finally, we run
the reduced form and our extended Kuznets relationship for the IER to see if the effects
are the same and if the inverted U-relationship if verified. Thus, the full specification of
our Pooled OLS analysis is the following:
























+ δt + εit
One limitation of doing Pooled OLS estimations is that it does not account for un-
observed heterogeneity between countries and results might be biased because of omitted
variables problem. Hence, aiming at finding the main drivers of inequality within coun-
tries, we conduct country fixed effects estimations, with time dummies and clustered
standard errors, on all 4 measures of inequality. This method allows for time-invariant
differences ηi in the error term, capturing only the net effect of the predictors on the out-
come variable. Contrasting with fixed effects, random effects models rely on the strong
assumption that these unobservables are orthogonal to the regressors. This assumption
is likely to be violated as there are country characteristics (e.g. cultural factors) that
might influence inequality and correlate with our predictors. To statistically confirm our
intuition, we conduct Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests, rejecting the null that both models are
consistent but fixed effects is inefficient in favor of the alternative hypothesis that random
effects is inconsistent, in all specifications.
Our research question faces considerable challenges as there is no standard empir-
ical specification nor a theoretical framework for the study of inequality.36 The shift
from regulated-capitalism to neoliberalism is characterized by considerable labor market
reforms (deregulation), disregard for full employment policies, and downscaling of gov-
ernment’s size (privatization).37 Therefore, we begin with the reduced form of our model
which only includes measures of Labor Deregulation, Unemployment and Government.
Another feature associated to the neoliberal era is the widening of financial markets and
expansion of international trade (liberalization) (Kotz, 2015). Hence, our baseline specifi-
cation for the determinants of inequality adds the proxies for Globalization and Financial
Openness.38 Lastly, to account for factors that have been pointed out to be important in
explaining inequality fluctuations, while testing for the effects of various covariates, we in-
clude vectors of political, social and economic controls.39 Thus, the complete specification
36Carter, 2007; Jaumotte, 2013; see also Atkinson and Brandolini, (undated). “The panel–of–countries
approach to explaining income inequality: an interdisciplinary research agenda” for a review of 27 panel
data studies of different determinants of income distribution.
37David Kotz (2015) defines regulated-capitalism as the form of capitalism in play in the post-war
period until the oil crisis (1948-1973) and neoliberal-capitalism as the post-1980 paradigm.
38Note that, although economic globalization (KOF1) incorporates FDI and portfolio investments, the
correlation of overall KOF and KOF1 with our measure of Financial Openness is only 0.1876 and 0.2575,
respectively. Thus, no multicollinearity issues are at stake.
39For the full set of controls in each vector refer to the Complete Fixed Effect Regressions in the
Appendix.
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of our panel estimations can be written as:
Inequalityit =α + β1 LDeregit + β2 Unemit + β3Govit + γ1KOFit + γ2 FinancialOPENit
(3)
+ φ1 Politicalit + φ2 Socialit + φ3Economicit︸ ︷︷ ︸
Controls/Covariates
+ηi + δt + εit
Lastly, we apply Difference-in-Differences methodologies, using the end of the Cold
War, marked by the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, as a quasi-experiment, concentrating
on the two gini measures which are the most commonly used indices of income inequality.40
Here, the countries belonging to the Eastern European Bloc are taken as the treatment
group, whereas the remaining European states (which we call Western) form the control
group.41 This procedure sheds light on the causality of the paradigm shift and the effects
found in the previous analysis, as it explores sharp changes in economic and political
environments undergone by the Eastern European countries, which did not occur in the
West in that period – i.e. experimental design is appropriate.
Our panel data allow us to make the most out of the Double-Differences approach
since it is possible to account for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity ηi and group-
invariant time effects δt, which could jeopardize our results due to selection bias.
42 The key
identifying assumption – a weak form of strict exogeneity – is that the average outcome
would have changed homogeneously across groups, in the absence of the “treatment”
(Transition). This is empirically gauged by verifying the presence of an arguable common
trend, across groups, in pre-treatment outcome evolution.
We firstly run Pooled OLS estimations on net and market gini coefficients, including
a vector of covariates Xit found to be relevant in the previous analysis, that are signif-
icantly different across treatment and control groups, and for which there is pre-1990
data – i.e. controlling for observable time-varying differences.43 To address the concerns
raised by Duflo et al. (2004) about the inference validity using this methodology, we use
Eicker-Huber-White standard errors, clustered in countries, to correct for autocorrelation
and heteroskedasticity (Roger, 1993). Moreover, we conduct a placebo quasi-experiment
40Mahutga and Bandelj (2008) argued that “directing attention to CEE [Central and Eastern European]
countries [is] a historically unique opportunity to gauge the effect of exposure to the world economy on
many development outcomes.”
41Eastern Bloc (treatment group) is composed of Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bul-
garia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro,
Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Ukraine. The Western control
group is made of: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United Kingdom.
42Note that the Fixed Effects estimations cancels out every time-invariant regressor such as the treat-
ment dummy Eastern which corresponds to the estimated pre-treatment outcome differences between
treatment and control groups.
43For a matter of consistency, we intended to investigate the causal effect of the liberalization on our
four measures of inequality, however we exclude the IER and Top Decile from our analysis since the
presence of a common trend was rather questionable.
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where the transition is from 1999 to 2000.44,45 What is more, we employ Duflo’s et al.
recommendation of aggregating pre- and post- intervention data to have solely two peri-
ods, removing the time-series dimension – Compiled specifications in Table 5. To further
appraise the robustness of the transition’s causal effect on inequality, we employ coun-
try fixed effects estimations and finally regress the following full specification (3) on a
subsample of 20 years.
Inequalityit = α + β Easterni × Post︸ ︷︷ ︸
Transition Causal Effect
+ρEasterni + γ Post+ ΦXit + ηi + δt + εit (4)
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Inequality and Growth – Kuznets Curve
Table 2: Augmented Kuznet’s Curve Revisited
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Net Gini Coefficient Kuznet Aug. Kuznet Tax Socialist Financial IER IER Full
Income 19.55** 31.86*** 30.55*** 37.52*** 49.17*** -78.42*** -46.88***
(7.943) (6.352) (8.345) (9.305) (10.56) (12.04) (13.49)
Quadratic Income -1.417*** -1.980*** -1.878*** -2.323*** -3.037*** 3.862*** 2.129***
(0.480) (0.381) (0.509) (0.575) (0.644) (0.704) (0.793)
State -26.11*** -31.16*** -13.56 -10.10 -20.38*
(6.678) (7.265) (9.056) (10.23) (11.45)
Transfers -0.468*** -0.442*** -0.318*** -0.269*** -0.310***
(0.0792) (0.0918) (0.0988) (0.0953) (0.105)
Tax System -57.27** -64.39** -53.87** -58.54*
(25.60) (24.58) (26.19) (34.64)




Observations 3912 1633 726 726 686 3912 726
Countries 157 123 111 111 101 157 111
Adjusted R2 0.283 0.512 0.568 0.605 0.632 0.693 0.800
Our results show the presence of a robust Kuznets curve relationship, explaining 28%
of inequality variations in our complete panel – 157 countries, from 1960 to 2015. At odds
with the findings of Anand and Kanbur (1993), we conclude that the relationship has not
weakened overtime. Consistent with the literature we find that the inclusion of national
idiosyncratic policies are important to explain inequality changes – the explanatory power
doubles.46 Thus, the results indicate that the relationship between growth and inequality
is neither linear nor monotonic, and our findings are consistent with the theory that
44Duflo, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) showed that the standard errors of constant regressors
within clusters (e.g. treatment variables) are inconsistent and underestimated in the presence of positive
autocorrelation: invalid inference. To illustrate the severity of the problem they recur to the CPS database
to randomly create placebo laws at the state-level, finding significant effects (at 5% level) for 45 percent
of these fake laws (treatments).
45As one does not expect to find significant inequality changes generated by the change in paradigm –
e.g. liberalization – one decade later when there was no apparent structural transformation.
46Williamson, 1991; Kaelble and Thomas, 1991; Milanovic, 1994.
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at early stages of development inequality rises but as the country develops there are
equalizing forces at work. However, the development level at which this turning point
occurs is much higher than the simple Kuznets curve would suggest. In the reduced form,
the turning point is reached at 990 per capita (1990 GK$) which is roughly the levels
of Kenya and Nepal. Whereas, accounting for distinctive national characteristics, the
equalizing trend only begins at development levels greater than 3100 per capita (1990
GK$) – e.g. Ukraine, Philippines and Morocco in the 2000s.
Interpreting the results, we see that raising Transfers by 10 GDP percentage points
(p.p.) reduces net inequality from 2.69 to 4.68 gini points, and the effect is significant
at 1% level. Increasing average tax rate progressivity by 1 standard deviation declines
inequality by 2 gini points (0.2 gini standard deviations), on average (significant at 5%
level). Moreover, if State consumption grows 10 percentage point, in terms of GDP,
inequality shrinks by 3 percentage points. Although this effect is significant at 1% level,
contrary to the impact of Transfers and the Tax System, it is no longer noteworthy
once we account for the political regime. In line with literature, we find that Socialist
countries have on average 7 to 8 gini points less inequality than in countries with similar
levels of development.47 This signifies almost one standard deviation less which would be
equivalent to Portugal – one of the most unequal OECD countries – achieving the level
of Norway’s net income inequality.48 Finally, if FDI liabilities increase by 10 p.p relative
to GDP net inequality widens by 2.44 percentage points.
We find evidence of an inverted Kuznets curve when we regress it on the IER, signif-
icant at 1% level. Note that Income is endogenous as the IER is a decreasing function
of the economy’s GDP per capita.49 This explains the higher explanatory power of its
specifications and the negative coefficient of Income. However, one does not expect to
see a significant quadratic relationship. According to (6), there is a turning point – es-
timated to be roughly 25600 per capita (1990 GK$) – from which inequality extraction
starts increasing. Looking at the countries that are beyond this threshold, it suggests that
inequality has been rising, with income accruing to those at the top of the distribution,
in many OECD countries, since the late 1990s.
5.2 Neoliberal Paradigm: Inequality Main Determinants
Our results from Tables 3 and 4 show that labor market reforms, that took place since the
1980s, have been one of the main drivers for the increase in global income inequality.50
This effect is significant at 1% level in most of the specifications and robust to the inclusion
a myriad of controls. Note that L.M. Deregulation is always regressed together with
Unemployment, avoiding any endogeneity issues arising from the possibility that labor
47Boswell and Chase-Dunn, 2000; Heyns, 2005.
48OECD report (2008); Moreover, in our database Norway has the lowest net gini coefficient (=22)
from all OECD countries, while Portugal (net gini above 36) is second most unequal European country,
after Latvia.
49see the Appendix. If the maximum feasible gini is a positive and concave function of Income per
capita, the former will increase with the latter but by less and less. Since the IER is the ratio of the gini
over this maximum, IER will converge to the gini as Income per capita goes to infinity and IER should
decrease by less and less. Thus, there should not be higher IERs for higher GDP per capita levels.
50Consistent with OECD report (2008) which argues that developments in these markets are the main
source of changes in income.
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regulation may increase the latter.51 These findings evidence that labor deregulation
degrades income distributions (Calderon et al., 2009; OECD, 2011) and increases the
share of the richest 10% (Dabla-Norris et al., 2015).
Unemployment is also an important determinant of the upturn in inequality, having
a larger widening impact on gross income inequality: a 1 percentage point increase in
the unemployment rate can raise market inequality by up to 0.3 gini points.52 Despite
the reduced redistributive power of welfare states,53 we find that a larger Government
is associated with a more equal income distribution, always having a negative coefficient
and being significant in about half of our specifications. One percentage point increase
of its size relative to GDP can decrease net inequality and the share of the top 10% by
more than 0.1 percentage points, significant at 1 percent level. As expected, the effect of
Government in gross income inequality is not significant, whereas it is significant in all
specifications of net inequality.
Consistent with the findings of Jaumoutte (2013) and the predictions of Perotti et
al.(2007), we find that Financial Openness increases income inequality. The rise of the
weight of the financial systems mainly increases market income inequality, being signifi-
cant at 1% in all specifications. An increase of one standard deviation increases inequality
by up to 5.3 percentage points. Furthermore, in line with the literature we find evidence
that globalization (KOF) was another major determinant of increasing income inequality
around the world, in the post-1980 period.54 Increasing the overall KOF index by one
standard deviation increases inequality from 3.5 to 4.6 percentage points. Its largest dif-
ferentiating effect is found on the Inequality Extraction Ratio, significant at 1% level, and
no evidence was found on its influence on the share of the top decile. Interestingly, polit-
ical and social globalization appear to have been equalizing forces of income distributions
worldwide, although having a smaller coefficient than the broad measure of globaliza-
tion. Our results contrast with Bergh and Nilsson (2010) who suggested that the positive
association between globalization and inequality is driven by its social component.
A surprising result is the significant positive association democracy has with the in-
come share of top deciles. Due to lowering turnouts in elections, the median voter theorem
does not have a direct application, and it is more likely that those who vote are the ones
who see their views influencing political outcomes (Stiglitz, 2012). In turn those at the
top have more influence on political decisions, lobbying to their benefit and preventing re-
distribution (Barro, 2000). Thus, Stiglitz (2012) argues that the “current system seem to
operate on one dollar one vote instead of one person one vote”. Our results are consistent
with those of Carter (2007) who finds positive significant coefficients for the quadratic of
political and civil liberties indexes.
51Note also that the correlation between both variables is close to zero in all our models.
52“The single most obvious feature distinguishing the recent decades from those after the Second World
War is the level of unemployment.” (Atkinson, 2015).
53“The redistributive power of the welfare state was weakened in the period between the mid-1990s to
mid-2000s. While in the period between mid-1980s and mid-1990s the share of increased market income
inequality offset by taxes and transfers was measured at the level of almost 60%, this share has declined
to around 20% by the mid-2000s.” by Frster et al. (2015), “Cross-Country Evidence of the Multiple
Causes of Inequality Changes in the OECD Area, in Anthony B. Atkinson and Franois Bourguignon,
Handbook of Income Distribution, vol. 2B (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2015, quote p. 1803).
54Dreher and Gaston (2008) analyzing OECD countries, for the period 1970-2000; Bergh and Nilsson,
2010 using 80 countries in the period 1970-2005; Atif et al. 2012 for 68 countries in the years 1990-2010.
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While human capital is found to have equalizing effects in developing countries,55 the
coefficient is positive for advanced economies.56 According to human capital investment
theory, the effects are conditional on the rate of return to education – i.e. skill premium
(Mincer, 1958). Firms’ adoption of labor saving technologies and outsourcing production,
coupled with increasing cost of education (Rajan, 2015), raised the skill premium in
developed countries (Feenstra and Hanson 1996). On the other hand, developing countries
have lower human capital levels, hence higher education could be decreasing the skill
premium, lowering income inequality.57 Assuming interest rates do not change, inflation
benefits borrowers and hurts savers because the value of money decreases. Richer agents
typically have better credit conditions and resort to loans to regularly invest their savings.
As expected, inflation is found to increase the share of the top decile and significantly
increases most measures of inequality. Consistent with Li et al. (1998), the Kuznets
explains poorly inequality within countries.58 Similarly to the results of Asteriou et al.
(2014) and opposing to Jaumotte (2013) main finding for inequality drivers, technology
is not significant in any specification.
Separately regressing the full specification on the subsample of advanced economies
and on the subsample of developing countries, we find that our globalization results only
remain for the latter while in advanced economies the effects are not significant. These
findings are directly at odds with the H-O predictions and in line with numerous papers
in the literature (see footnote 16). Although Financial Openness loses significance for
advanced economies, it is always positive and significantly increases market inequalities by
a similar amount. On the other hand, in emerging and developing countries, 1 percentage
point increase of the latter increases the net gini by up to 5 points, market inequalities
widen by more than 6.2 points, and the elite extracts circa 8 percentage points more (IER),
all significant at 1% level. Labor Market Deregulation significantly increases the share of
the Top 10% twice as much in the developing countries than in advanced economies,
significant at 1% level. On the contrary, Unemployment has a more relevant impact on
advanced economies, except for the positive effects on the top decile. Using the developing
countries subsample, the effects on top deciles are significant in all specificantions whereas
for advanced economies only in the reduced form. Government has a more important
equalizing role in advanced economies, not being significant for developing countries.
Interestingly, Democracy significantly increases all four measures of inequality in advanced
economies with coefficients close to 1, while it only increases the top decile in the rest
of the world. Finally, we run the same specifications using the 5 quintiles as dependent
variables. Quintile regression analysis provides robustness for our results. Effects of L.M.
Deregulation, Unemployment and Government are significant most of the times, show a
positive coefficient (negative for Government) for the 5th quintile and have the opposite
sign for all other quintiles.59
55Calderon et al., 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson 2002; Engerman et al., 1998.
56Dabla-Norris, 2015; Mastromarco et al., 2011; Bergh et al., 2010; Barro, 2000.
57Checchi (2001), using a panel of 94 countries (developed and developing), found that years of schooling
and inequality follow a U-shaped relation with a lower turning point at 6.5 years.
58see the Appendix for the complete specification results: Both income regressors are not significant.
Moreover, urban population and shares of employment in agriculture and industry are not significant,
while the theory would predict a negative sign for the share of agricultural employment and a positive
one for the other two.













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5.3 Quasi-Experiment: Liberalization of Eastern Bloc
Table 5: Difference-in-Difference for Eastern Bloc Liberalization
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Net Gini Coefficient Market Gini Coefficient
OLS Subsample Fixed Effects Compiled OLS Subsample Fixed Effects Compiled
Transition 6.648*** 4.570*** 4.280*** 4.961** 8.895** 8.240*** 7.584*** 7.784*
β (1.935) (1.551) (1.197) (2.340) (3.340) (2.720) (1.825) (3.917)
Pre-1990 Group Diff. -5.013* -5.301* -8.992*** -6.360 -5.715 -8.465*
ρ (2.510) (2.927) (3.023) (4.068) (3.665) (4.578)
Western Time Diff. 4.324*** 4.015*** 4.075 8.531*** 2.963* 3.250** 0.801 5.452***
γ (1.202) (0.852) (5.304) (1.722) (1.532) (1.502) (5.935) (1.429)
Placebo 1.514 0.121 1.22 1.1 1.96 0.912 2.378 0.151
Pre- and Post- 2000 (1.450) (1.109) ( 1.060) ( 1.204) (1.863) (1.487) (1.70) (1.736)
Observations 844 559 844 844 844 559 559 844
Countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33
Years 1970-2011 1985-2005 1970-2011 1970-2011 1970-2011 1985-2005 1985-2005 1970-2011
R2 Transition 0.391 0.395 0.363 0.615 0.405 0.323 0.458 0.526
R2 Placebo 0.283 0.357 0.324 0.212 0.314 0.265 0.435 0.236
The Difference-in-Difference analysis presents some interesting results. We find evidence
of a causal effect of the liberalization of the Eastern European Bloc on both measures
of income inequality. The transition to a market-oriented economy, which marked the
change in paradigm in the early 1990s, significantly increased net income inequality by
4.3 to 6.7 percentage points whereas market income dispersion expanded by more than 7.5
percentage points. We argue that underlying effects of this Transition are associated with
our main findings of Section 5.2, which can be seen in Figure 4 (Appendix). The change
in paradigm had larger impacts in terms of market income inequality, amplifying market
gini up to circa 9 percentage points (significant at 5%). This is not surprising since gross
income distributions tend to have a higher variance and because these countries have a
legacy of broad welfare states which continued to redistribute, compensating for the fall
in collective bargaining.
It is interesting to note that the OLS estimated inequality causal effect of the transi-
tion is very similar to the predicted world average equalizing effect of a Socialist regime,
in (4) of Table 2.60 All transition (β) effects are significant at conventional levels and
mostly at 1% level. As expected, employing Duflo et al.(2004) recommendation of com-
piling the data into two periods substantially increases the standard errors, decreasing
the coefficient’s significance. Although the transition’s impact on inequality is robust
for both measures of inequality, results for market income dispersion are less sensitive to
methodology’s differences.61
Consistent with our findings of Section 5.1, results indicate that before the transition,
to what Kotz (2015) considers neoliberal-capitalism, the Eastern countries had signifi-
cantly lower levels of inequality (after transfers and taxes) than the Western countries:
ρ < 0. We also find evidence of the latter in terms of market inequality once we aggregate
60Note that both OLS estimations have the net gini coefficient as the dependent variable and both
effects are significant at 1% confidence level.
61Employing Double-Differences analysis using unbalanced panels, differences between OLS and FE
estimations might arise from time-varying panel non-response. Under these conditions, OLS methodology
is more efficient than Fixed Effects (Lechner et al., 2015).
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Figure 2: Inequality Evolution: West vs East
pre- and post- 1989 data, significant at 5% level. Another result which corroborates Fig-
ure 2 is the increase of both inequality measures in Western countries: γ > 0, although
not significant in fixed effects estimations. This upturn of inequality in the control group
occurred in the early 1980s, while for the treatment group it happened exactly in the year
the Berlin wall fell (1989, transition year). Additionally, the placebo’s quasi-experiment
“treatment” effects are insignificant in all specifications and their explanatory power is
always lower. This points to a good identification strategy of our Difference-in-Difference
methodology (Gertler et al., 2010).
Literature on the use of this quasi-experiment design for the impacts on income in-
equality is relatively scant.62 Using the same natural experiment of former soviet coun-
tries, Mahutga and Bandelj (2008) found robust evidence that the transition enlarged
inequality through inflows of FDI. Also consistent with our inequality concerns from
the neoliberal paradigm, the authors found that income dispersion increased more in
post-socialist that privatized more and reduced the role of government in the economy
(Mahutga and Bandelj, 2010).63 To the extent of our knowledge, this is the first paper to
explore the income inequality consequences of the transition of the Central and Eastern
European countries, using Double-Differences methodologies.
62Other papers have explored the German re-unification as an exogenous variation for the application
of Double-Differences approach. For example, Gebel and Voemer (2014) investigate the effects of the
transition between employment and unemployment on health; and Buettner (2007) estimates the effects
on employment and wages.
63Brune et al. (2004) defend that privatization is intrinsically a neoliberal policy idea.
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6 Can we explain Atkinson’s Inequality Turn?
Figure 3: Main Determinants of Inequality
Interestingly, my results lend empirical support to a number of theories put forward by
authors such as Atkinson, David Kotz, Stiglitz and Robert Reich. The determinants of
income inequality found in Section 5.2 are associated with a series of structural reforms
that are better understood given a brief historical context.
After the Second World War, the dominant economic school of thought perceived the
state as a major player in the economy. Focusing on aggregate demand, Keynesianism
saw no automatic mechanism to ensure full employment or fair distribution of income,
arguing that governments should act in case of market failures, namely through fiscal and
monetary policy. These ideas had their peak in the 1960s and prevailed throughout what
some authors call the “Golden Age of Capitalism” (Marglin and Schor, 1990). Indeed,
Maddison (1995) found that period - from late 1940s until early 1970s - to be have the
highest growth rates, worldwide, since 1820.
Besides growth, the immediate post-war period recorded low levels of inequality arising
from a new set of social attitudes and a greater sense of social solidarity (Atkinson, 2015).
Goldin and Margo (1992) described it as the “The Great Compression” as not only top
income shares fell homogeneously in all OECD countries but many European countries
saw their gini falling 4-10 percentage points.64 Under the economic system which Kotz
64The authors defend that this compression, in the US, is not so much explained by SBTC but rather
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defined as regulated-capitalism, inequality declined thanks to sharp increase of women
participation (percentage of working married women more than doubled between 1947
and 1977), rapid growth of government transfers (doubled between 1955-70 relative to
national income), progressive taxation (US top income tax rate averaged 75% between
1950-79), collective bargaining and government intervention in labor markets (Atkinson,
2015).65 Moreover, during this “Great Prosperity”, wages of lower-income Americans
grew faster than those at or near the top (Reich, 2010).
However, the previous paradigm saw its end after the global oil crisis of 1973, with the
collapse of Bretton Woods and the failure of fiscal and monetary policies to control un-
employment, increasing inflation even more. Rooted on the ideas of Hayek and Friedman,
and implemented mainly by Reagan, Thatcher and Greenspan: liberalization, privati-
zation, and stabilization took over.66 Globalization and technological progress reduced
the share of wages (Reich, 2010), while financial markets became a dominant power with
deregulation (Arrighi, 1994; Dumenil and Levy, 2004). These series of complex structural
reforms, associated with financialization (Epstein, 2005), marked the beginning of the
neoliberal paradigm where “market relations and market forces operate relatively freely
and play the predominant role in the economy” (Kotz, 2015). In the UK, just within the
last 6 years of the 1980s, the equalizing effect of transfers to lessening the gini coefficient
fell by 8 percentage points (Atkinson, 2015).
What Atkinson called the Inequality Turn, in post-1980 years, coincided with the shift
of the global politico-economic paradigm and with the proliferation of the “Washing-
ton Consensus”, so criticized by Stiglitz (2002, 2015) and others (Rodrik, 2006; Reinert,
2000).67 Looking at the global trends in Figure 3, we see this Turn of market (increased
7 percentage points) and net inequality (by 5 percentage points) beginning in the early
1980s, followed by the process of globalization (KOF increased from 45 to 75), labor mar-
ket deregulation (increased by one standard deviation), persistently high unemployment
(above 6%) and government downscale (lower than 20% of GDP). Moreover, the weight
of financial systems relative to GDP tripled in the early 1990s, and nowadays, represent
roughly 600% of the world’s GDP. This trend was followed by rising top 1% and top 10%
shares of income, beginning in 1980s. Finally, the declining share of labor compensation
followed a similar path of the sharp reduction in union membership rates.68,69
that it was achieved mainly due to institutional changes, point out to reforms like the National Industrial
Recovery Act (1933) and the National War on Labor Board (1940s).
65Kotz defined it as the form of capitalism operating between 1948 and 1973 under the Bretton Woods
system, moderately open economy but with capital movement constraints, regulation of financial sector
which mainly provide financing for businesses and households, anti-trust enforcement, welfare state,
progressive taxation and a major role of collective bargaining.
66“Stabilize, privatize, and liberalize became the mantra of a generation of technocrats who cut their
teeth in the developing world and of the political leaders they counseled” (Rodrik, 2006).
67“(...)a set of policies predicated upon a strong faith – stronger than warranted – in unfettered markets
and aimed at “reducing, or even minimizing, the role of government.” (Stiglitz, 2015).
68Checchi et al. (2010) found that increasing wage shares by 1 p.p. leads to a reduction on 0.7 gini
poins, in a sample of 16 OECD countries for the period 1970-1996.
69Which is higher than actual wage shares, as it accounts for what employers contribute for pensions,
social and health insurance (Bernstein, 2013). Karabarbounis et al. (2014) found that the share of wages
declined in 42 out of 59 developed and developing countries. Piketty (2013) showed that after steady
increases of wage share between 1950 and 1970, in all countries with adequate data (except for Japan),
there were decreasing shares between late 1970s and 2000s. Conversely, the author showed that capital’s
share of total income enlarged in most OECD countries, between 1970 and 2010.
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7 Conclusion
This research investigates the main drivers behind the Inequality Turn which marked the
increase of global income inequality, in the post-1980 period, using a panel of more than
100 countries, over the period 1960-2015. We find that structural reforms arising from
the global proliferation of neoliberal-capitalism are associated with the rise of income
inequality, around the world.
Our results show that deregulation of labor markets, downscaling of the role of govern-
ments in the economy and the rise of unemployment to persistently high levels, increased
income disparities within countries. Moreover, the process of globalization and the sharp
increase in the weight of financial markets over the real economy, in the late 1980s, con-
tributed for the widening of income distributions – particularly in developing countries
and in terms of market inequalities. Interestingly, the social and political components of
globalization have been equalizing forces, though with small offsetting effects. Analyzing
the effects on separate subsamples (advanced economies and the rest of the world) we
find evidence against the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. This examination demonstrates that
the positive association between democracy and inequality measures is stronger in ad-
vanced economies – crony capitalism might be operating in some OECD countries. These
results suggest that institutional changes are a better explanation for the rise of inequality
than the “skill-biased technological change” proposition.
Investigating the relationship between growth and inequality, we find evidence of the
Kuznets Curve relationship: at earlier stages of development, inequality tends to increase
with growth while at later stages of progress there are equalizing forces at work. We also
find evidence that the inclusion of idiosyncratic policies and institutions are paramount for
the study of this relationship and that the turning point occurs at higher GDP per capita
levels than the simple Kuznets would suggest. Results also indicate the presence of an
inverted curve for the Inequality Extraction Ratio. This may suggest that in many OECD
countries, the elite could extract larger shares of possible inequality, since the 1990s. We
also find robust evidence that the expose of the Eastern European countries, in the early
1990s, to the underlying paradigm of the worlds economy, substantially increased income
inequality.
This paper entails the usual data limitations of cross-country studies, particularly
arising from the reliability of inequality measures which encompass higher measurement
errors. We mitigated this issue by using rigorous comparability selection criteria, ensuring
a balanced tradeoff between comparability and coverage. What is more, due to the lack of
theoretical and empirical frameworks for the study of inequality, our results might suffer
from some degree of omitted time-varying characteristics. Two of these dimensions are
the union density and the share of labor income which have been pointed out, by the
literature, as important determinants.
One interesting avenue for further research is to investigate the extent to which these
upturns in inequality and excessive shares at the top of income distributions have a causal
impact on major financial crisis. Furthermore, using a smaller sample due to lack of data
availability, it would be appealing to estimate the effects union membership and the falling
shares of labor income have on income distributions. What is more, future papers could
explore to what extent the drivers of income inequality explain global wealth dispersion.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Inequality Extraction Ratio Derivation (Milanovic, 2010)
The Gini formula (Corrado Gini, 1912) for society with n groups with mean income y
ordered in ascendant fashion (yj > yi) is:







j>i(yj − yi)pipj︸ ︷︷ ︸
between groups inequality
(5)
Where Gi is the inequality within the i-th social class, pi is the proportion of people
belonging to the i-th group and πi is the proportion of total income received by that social
class. If we imagine a society with just 2 groups – the elite Nε and the rest N(1 − ε) –
where each individual receives the same mean group income, N is total population and
ε is the proportion of society that belongs to the elite (e.g. 0.1%). Then the within




(yj − yi)pipj (6)
Suppose further that everyone only receives the subsistence minimum income (s)
whereas the elite extracts the entire surplus of total income (µN):
yj =





[µ− s(1− ε)] ; yi = s
Substituting these group mean incomes in equation (6) we arrive at the Inequality






[µ− s(1− ε)]}ε(1− ε)
Rearranging and re-writing the economy’s mean income as a multiple of the subsis-
tence level µ = αs, for α ≥ 1, we get the simplified expression for the maximum feasible
inequality:












}ε(1− ε) = α−1
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(1− ε)








and accounting for the different elasticities λIncGroup with which the social minimum
increases as mean income of the economy rises, we arrive at the expression used for the
construction of the maximum gini in our panel of 157 countries:
GMax(α, λIncGroup) = 1− 1αα
λ







8.2 Complete Fixed Effects Regressions
Fixed Effects Inequality Extraction Ratio Top Income Decile
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Reduced Form Globalization Political Political + Social Full Controls Reduced Form Globalization Political Political + Social Full Controls
L.M. Flexibilization 0.873*** 0.826*** 0.816*** 0.403** 0.479*** 0.741*** 0.782*** 0.790*** 0.553*** 0.440**
(0.179) (0.177) (0.184) (0.190) (0.171) (0.137) (0.142) (0.136) (0.152) (0.180)
Unemployment 0.149*** 0.106** 0.117** 0.140** 0.0318 0.133*** 0.110*** 0.0871** 0.118*** 0.103
(0.0465) (0.0506) (0.0514) (0.0608) (0.0602) (0.0326) (0.0371) (0.0342) (0.0360) (0.0622)
Government -0.0626 -0.0671 -0.0715 -0.100** -0.0827* -0.0661 -0.0671 -0.0553 -0.110*** -0.0604**
(0.0527) (0.0532) (0.0511) (0.0483) (0.0469) (0.0488) (0.0480) (0.0443) (0.0357) (0.0277)
Globalization -0.0384 -0.0485 -0.0726 0.247*** 0.0226 0.0315 -0.0520 0.0286
(0.0457) (0.0525) (0.0884) (0.0892) (0.0407) (0.0494) (0.0800) (0.0930)
Financial Openness 0.543*** 0.470*** 0.502 0.472 0.209** 0.200** 0.143 0.650
(0.149) (0.126) (1.164) (1.138) (0.0892) (0.0903) (0.539) (0.854)
Political Globalization 0.00740 -0.0134 -0.0969*** -0.0201 -0.0119 -0.0224
(0.0325) (0.0357) (0.0326) (0.0304) (0.0356) (0.0406)
Democracy -0.0285 0.0349 0.0632 0.159** 0.150* 0.217*
(0.132) (0.128) (0.183) (0.0614) (0.0829) (0.119)
Social Globalization -0.0103 -0.122*** 0.0532 -0.0354
(0.0415) (0.0368) (0.0424) (0.0527)
Human capital -9.111*** -3.870 -2.389 -0.742
(3.240) (3.078) (3.954) (5.279)
AE*Human Capital 10.68*** 6.611 3.301 -0.356
(3.010) (4.484) (2.680) (5.531)
Educational Inequality 0.0687 0.0384 -0.0274 0.0883
(0.113) (0.125) (0.117) (0.184)
Female Mortality 3.964* 8.750*** 6.174** 9.505***
(2.341) (1.979) (2.836) (3.464)
Urban Population (%) 0.106 0.138 0.0648 0.124*
(0.0957) (0.0935) (0.0463) (0.0726)
Elderly Population (%) 0.341** 0.107 0.164 0.0538
(0.169) (0.268) (0.195) (0.308)
Population (millions) 0.0297 0.0533*** -0.0478*** -0.0679
(0.0224) (0.0160) (0.0166) (0.0469)
Lagged GDP growth 0.00579 -0.0124
(0.0225) (0.0425)
Log(GDP per capita) -77.74*** 2.457
(19.02) (20.62)














Constant 32.70*** 35.13*** 35.65*** 21.09 327.5*** 26.90*** 25.92*** 25.78*** -0.208 -36.38
(1.648) (2.763) (2.962) (16.10) (81.28) (1.543) (2.482) (2.503) (22.47) (91.79)
Observations 1250 1078 965 848 673 795 671 597 520 444
Countries 115 110 105 91 87 98 94 86 73 69
Years 1980-2014 1980-2011 1980-2010 1980-2010 2000-2010 1980-2014 1980-2011 1980-2010 1980-2010 2000-2010
Adjusted R-squared 0.174 0.166 0.170 0.318 0.455 0.217 0.195 0.184 0.267 0.272
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Fixed Effects Net Income Inequality Market Income Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Reduced Form Globalization Political Political + Social Full Controls Reduced Form Globalization Political Political + Social Full Controls
L.M. Flexibilization 0.669*** 0.620*** 0.589*** 0.335** 0.427*** 0.680** 0.545** 0.461* 0.0434 0.159
(0.159) (0.153) (0.155) (0.160) (0.154) (0.261) (0.262) (0.278) (0.269) (0.184)
Unemployment 0.138*** 0.108** 0.0985** 0.0968* 0.00328 0.290*** 0.214*** 0.183** 0.178** 0.0633
(0.0421) (0.0426) (0.0465) (0.0523) (0.0520) (0.0625) (0.0710) (0.0796) (0.0774) (0.0730)
Government -0.0956* -0.0905* -0.0892* -0.105*** -0.0809** -0.0361 -0.0240 -0.0223 -0.0574 -0.0588
(0.0514) (0.0503) (0.0505) (0.0397) (0.0379) (0.0611) (0.0615) (0.0617) (0.0497) (0.0393)
Globalization -0.000724 -0.00652 0.0160 0.216*** 0.0264 0.0453 0.0799 0.189**
(0.0409) (0.0489) (0.0755) (0.0786) (0.0568) (0.0665) (0.101) (0.0835)
Financial Openness 0.337*** 0.293** 0.221 0.751 0.650*** 0.624*** 1.970*** 3.437***
(0.124) (0.121) (0.944) (1.067) (0.184) (0.175) (0.591) (0.924)
Political Globalization 0.00932 -0.0211 -0.0905*** -0.0165 -0.0735 -0.0950***
(0.0274) (0.0303) (0.0279) (0.0464) (0.0451) (0.0294)
Democracy -0.00253 0.00524 0.0397 -0.00864 0.0201 0.0400
(0.112) (0.101) (0.158) (0.130) (0.121) (0.191)
Social Globalization -0.0348 -0.137*** -0.0677 -0.128**
(0.0372) (0.0350) (0.0539) (0.0543)
Human capital -9.000*** -5.922* -7.914** -6.990**
(2.765) (2.984) (3.259) (3.377)
AE*Human Capital 7.947*** 8.780** 8.850*** 16.41***
(2.548) (4.338) (3.141) (4.887)
Educational Inequality -0.0888 -0.0203 -0.111 -0.00532
(0.0799) (0.107) (0.0933) (0.130)
Female Mortality 2.490 4.942*** 4.042* 9.831***
(1.920) (1.854) (2.344) (2.155)
Urban Population (%) 0.0991 0.103 -0.0447 0.0553
(0.0754) (0.0854) (0.120) (0.107)
Elderly Population (%) 0.273* 0.160 0.887*** 0.445
(0.143) (0.248) (0.282) (0.354)
Population (millions) 0.0481** 0.0401*** 0.0509** 0.0254**
(0.0201) (0.0131) (0.0236) (0.0127)
Lagged GDP growth 0.0119 0.00233
(0.0193) (0.0210)
Log(GDP per capita) 0.616 29.06
(15.80) (18.88)














Constant 30.70*** 30.92*** 31.06*** 28.76** -4.637 37.05*** 36.56*** 37.71*** 32.97* -165.0*
(1.515) (2.400) (2.562) (13.43) (70.32) (2.623) (3.678) (4.130) (17.88) (83.90)
Observations 1250 1078 965 848 673 1250 1078 965 848 673
Countries 115 110 105 91 87 115 110 105 91 87
Years 1980-2014 1980-2011 1980-2010 1980-2010 2000-2010 1980-2014 1980-2011 1980-2010 1980-2010 2000-2010
Adjusted R-squared 0.161 0.150 0.150 0.320 0.351 0.213 0.189 0.180 0.320 0.389
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Figure 4: Inequality Drivers associated with the Transition
8.3 List of Socialist Countries in Dummy
China, Cuba, Lao, Viet Nam, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Mongolia, Yemen, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
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